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REDUNDANT PRIOR ART REFERENCES AND THEIR
PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS ON POST-ISSUANCE REVIEW
PETITIONERS
ABSTRACT
The recent passing of the America Invents Act came with the creation of
three brand new forms of post-issuance review: inter partes review, post-grant
review, and covered business method patent review. Through the first three
years, inter partes review has been widely utilized, while covered business
method patent review has received considerable attention as well. Part of the
reason for their popularity is the statutorily required one-year mandate of
issuing a final decision from the date the Patent Trial and Appeal Board elects
to institute proceedings. The quick adjudication and minimal discovery that
goes into these proceedings makes these proceedings a cost-effective
alternative to litigation for third parties.
However, the PTAB has created a procedural tool not explicitly included in
either the statutes or regulations. When instituting review of one or more
patent claims, the PTAB may allow the proceeding to continue based on
certain grounds it deems has a reasonable likelihood of success, while also
denying review on other equally favorable grounds of unpatentability,
declaring these grounds redundant to those on which the PTAB grants review.
In the extreme, this tool makes sense, as the PTAB could not adjudicate the
proceeding within one year if it had to make determinations based on hundreds
of grounds of patentability; but, the PTAB often uses this to dispose of only one
or two grounds of unpatentability that would not significantly burden either the
PTAB or the other parties.
The issue with this procedural tool is the costly estoppel effects it could
have on the petitioner in the event of an unfavorable decision either at the
PTAB or Federal Circuit level. A decision not to institute proceedings is final
and non-appealable, which would apply to grounds not instituted due to
redundancy. This means that if a petitioner receives an unfavorable decision at
the PTAB level, the petitioner is only permitted to appeal based on the
non-redundant grounds. Furthermore, if the petitioner receives an unfavorable
decision on appeal, it is estopped from asserting those redundant grounds
again at the PTAB level or even in concurrent or subsequent litigation.

HIGH GALLEYSPROOFS2

582

1/14/2016 2:40 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:581

Because these proceedings are still in their infancy, no appeal regarding these
issues has made its way through the Federal Circuit.
One solution to this problem would be for the PTAB to conditionally
institute proceedings on all grounds it agrees shows a reasonable likelihood of
success, have the petitioner choose what it thinks are the strongest grounds for
unpatentability, and continue the proceeding based on those grounds. This
would strike the correct balance between promoting efficiency and inexpensive
alternatives to litigation and preserving the petitioner’s rights on those
grounds. Another solution would be to interpret the statute so that
determinations of redundancy are appealable to the Federal Circuit, allowing
the petitioner to subsequently assert those grounds of unpatentability if it can
demonstrate that they are not redundant.
INTRODUCTION
With the recent adoption of the America Invents Act (AIA), Congress set
out to improve the quality of the patents in the United States patent system by
expanding the ways in which third parties can invalidate patents that should
never have issued in the first place. For a patent to issue, the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) examines the patent application to determine if the
application relates to patentable subject matter and is useful, novel, and
non-obvious.1 The application must also adequately disclose what the
invention is and contain claims sufficiently definite so that it puts the public on
notice of the invention and so that it teaches a person having ordinary skill in
that field how to make the invention.2 These requirements are designed to
promote innovation while at the same time protect information already in the
public domain. However, this examination system is not adversarial in nature.3
Due to the PTO’s limited time and resources to review patent applications, it is
inevitable that some patent applications will issue because the examiner could
not find the invalidating prior art.4

1

Leahy–Smith American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 131 (2012).
Id. § 112; see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.08 (9th ed. Mar. 2014) (stating that
the disclosure must be commensurate in scope with the patent claims to enable one skilled in the art to make
and use the claimed invention and must be sufficiently clear to put the public on notice of the scope of the
invention).
3 See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 38 (2d. ed. 2014) (discussing that patent prosecution is
only between the applicant and the examiner).
4 Id. at 44.
2
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To help remedy this situation, Congress created new post-issuance
proceedings, held before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), which
allow third parties to challenge the validity of a patent, even if that third party
has not yet been threatened with a lawsuit.5 Post-grant review (PGR) and
covered business method patent review (CBM review) allow a third party to
challenge a patent’s validity on any ground, whereas inter partes review (IPR)
only allows a third party to challenge validity for novelty or non-obviousness
reasons.6 The AIA, designed to provide a relatively quick and inexpensive
alternative to litigation, limits the duration of each of these proceedings.7
Through the first two years, these proceedings have been widely utilized, with
the results statistically favoring the petitioner thus far.8
In an effort to meet its one-year time limit from the date it issues
proceedings, the PTAB has created a procedure that, from the perspective of
petitioners, is concerning for the future. When the petitioner submits its
petition, it may list multiple grounds to invalidate individual patent claims, and
each of these grounds may be meritorious.9 When this is the case, the PTAB
often trims down the material it must review in the post-issuance proceeding
by instituting the proceeding based on some of the meritorious grounds but not
others, declaring the latter grounds redundant.10 For the remainder of the
proceeding, the redundant grounds cannot be considered.11
This procedure created by the PTAB could lead to substantially unfair
outcomes for the petitioner due to the estoppel that attaches in both the current
and subsequent proceedings. Upon a final written decision, the challenger is
precluded from raising any issues in district court litigation that it raised or
could have raised in front of the PTAB.12 As a result, a finding of redundancy
leaves the challenger with only some of its grounds for unpatentability, and the
PTAB never considers the challenger’s “redundant” grounds.

5

Leahy–Smith American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321 (2012).
Id.; Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329–30 (2011).
7 35 U.S.C. §§ 316, 326.
8 Daniel F. Klodowski & David Seastrunk, Claim and Case Disposition, FINNEGAN: AM. INVENTS ACT
(October 1, 2015), http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition.
9 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 312, 326.
10 See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00003 (JL), 2012 WL 9494791,
at *2 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012) (establishing the redundancy doctrine).
11 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.220 (2014) (stating that “[a] patent owner may file a response to the petition
addressing any ground for unpatentability not already denied”).
12 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
6
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When taken to the extreme, the PTAB must have some way to avoid
reviewing hundreds of potentially valid grounds of invalidity, or else it would
have no way of meeting its one-year statutory mandate.13 More often, however,
the PTAB uses this device to avoid deciding only one or two grounds of
unpatentability.14 The minimal amount of time which the PTAB saves by
declaring only one or two grounds of unpatentability redundant does not justify
precluding the challenger from asserting those grounds in any subsequent
proceedings, whether on appeal or in concurrent district court litigation.15 This
procedure is not in line with the AIA’s intended purpose of providing an
inexpensive proceeding to invalidate patents that never should have issued in
the first place.16
Ultimately, the PTAB must move away from this procedure. It can
eliminate these potentially critical side effects while maintaining its goal of
quickly resolving disputes if it simply institutes proceedings on all meritorious
grounds and limits the resulting proceeding to grounds it deems non-redundant.
This would preserve the petitioner’s right to an appeal while making the
proceeding as quick and efficient as possible. If the PTAB does not mitigate
this issue, the Federal Circuit should step in and either disfavor the procedure
or declare redundant grounds appealable. This Comment will (1) give a history
of post-issuance proceedings and the background of the AIA; (2) explore the
redundancy doctrine and its potential negative effects on third-party requesters;
and (3) present proposed solutions to those problems.
I. HISTORY OF POST-ISSUANCE PROCEEDINGS AND THE
BACKGROUND OF THE AIA
Patent litigation has recently come to be known for its extremely high
litigation costs, highlighted even more during the recent onslaught of patent
assertion entity (PAE) cases. PAEs, more negatively referred to as patent
13

See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 9494791, at *1 (asserting 422 grounds of unpatentability).
See Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088, 2013 WL 5970180, at *3 (P.T.A.B. June
13, 2013) (declining on request for rehearing to institute review on a single redundant obviousness ground
when the PTAB instituted review based only on anticipation grounds).
15 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC., No. IPR2013-00083
(JYC), 2013 WL 5970177, at *2 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2013) (arguing in a request for rehearing that adding only
one additional redundant ground would not significantly affect the amount of time required to adjudicate the
proceeding).
16 157 CONG. REC. S1360–02 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (explaining that these
new streamlined review proceedings will help improve the quality of patents and be an effective alternative to
litigation).
14
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trolls,17 generally look to acquire “vaguely worded, broadly defined patents”
but never actually conduct any business related to the inventions in the
patents.18 Instead, much of their income comes from threatening to sue the
companies who may be infringing their patents. Typically PAEs are “more
interested in negotiating a license than enforcing [their] patent rights.”19 PAEs
have virtually no discovery costs and their attorneys often work on
contingency fee,20 so there is a huge disparity in the costs of litigation between
the PAEs and the accused infringers, leaving defendants little leverage for
settlements.21 With this in mind, Congress set out to improve the pre-AIA inter
partes reexamination proceedings, seeking to create inexpensive alternatives to
litigation that allow accused infringers to challenge a patent’s validity and
possibly dispose of the dispute in a timely fashion.22 The PTO’s subsequent
regulations have reflected this emphasis.23 Through the first few years of these
post-issuance reviews, the reforms have been largely effective, as petitioners
have been successful more often than not.24
To better understand how the PTAB has developed this practice of
declaring grounds of unpatentability redundant, it is first important to
understand how post-issuance proceedings have developed since their creation.
While initially intended to be an alternative to litigation, the post-issuance
administrative proceedings available to third parties prior to the AIA had not
lived up to their purpose. Ex parte reexaminations did not allow third-party
participation beyond the initial filing of the petition.25 While inter partes
reexaminations allowed for ongoing third-party participation, these

17 Representative Smith referred to patent trolls as “those entities that vacuum up patents by the hundreds
or thousands and whose only innovations occur in the courtroom.” 157 CONG. REC. H4485–86 (daily ed. June
23, 2011) (Statement of Rep. Smith).
18 Ashli Weiss, An Insight into the Apparel Industry’s Patent Troll Problem, 6 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH.
L.J. 121, 127 (2014) (student-written article).
19 Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222 (D. Utah 2005).
20 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
2117, 2162–63 (Dec. 2013).
21 Ahmed J. Davis & Karolina Jesien, The Balance of Power in Patent Law: Moving Towards
Effectiveness in Addressing Patent Troll Concerns, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 835, 837–
38 (2012).
22 Leahy–Smith American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 85
(2011).
23 37 C.F.R. § 42.1 (2014).
24 Klodowski & Seastrunk, supra note 8.
25 J. Steven Baughman, Reexamining Reexaminations: A Fresh Look at the Ex Parte and Inter Partes
Mechanisms for Reviewing Issued Patents, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 349, 352 (2007).
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proceedings were often very lengthy, lasting upwards of two to three years.26
As a result, neither achieved popularity.27 Congress set out to address many of
the issues with these pre-AIA post-issuance proceedings as it drafted the new
laws. This Part will (1) outline the history of administrative proceedings in
front of the PTO generally; (2) explain the shortcomings of inter partes
reexaminations, leading to the creation of new proceedings under the AIA; and
(3) go into depth on the new post-issuance proceedings created by the AIA.
A. Reissuance and Reexamination
After the PTO grants a patent, its role regarding that patent is not
necessarily over. Multiple administrative proceedings are available to both the
patent owner and third parties to either correct issues not caught during the first
examination, or invalidate the patent altogether. The oldest of such
proceedings is the reissuance proceeding, which provides the patent owner an
opportunity to correct mistakes made.28 The other is the reexamination, which,
prior to the AIA, allowed a third party to challenge the validity of a patent if
there was a substantial question not previously raised during the patent’s
examination.29 This section will provide a history and basic overview of
administrative procedures that existed prior to the AIA to understand how the
AIA post-issuance review procedures evolved into what they are today.
Congress first codified the power to reissue a defective patent in 1832,
which the courts progressively broadened, culminating in the 1952 Patent
Act.30 Patent reissuance allows the patent owner to submit an application for
reissue to cure any errors relating to “a defective specification or drawing” or
“claiming more or less than [the patentee] had a right to claim in the patent”
that deem the patent inoperative or invalid.31 If the newly-amended patent
application corrects the errors, the PTO reissues the patent for the remainder of

26 Andrei Iancu, Ben Haber & Elizabeth Iglesias, Challenging Validity of Issued Patents Before the PTO:
Inter Partes Reexam Now or Inter Partes Review Later?, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 148, 156
(2012).
27 Mark Colsilvio & Jonathan R.K. Stroud, Unraveling the USPTO’s Tangled Web: An Empirical
Analysis of the Complex World of Post-Issuance Patent Proceedings, 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33, 51 (2013)
(noting that after starting slow, requests for reexaminations were on the rise prior to the AIA).
28 Leahy–Smith American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2012).
29 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2006).
30 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792; Scott E. Kamholz, The Proscription Against Broadening
Claims in Reissue and Reexamination: Conflict Between the Federal Circuit and the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 124, 126–28 (2006).
31 35 U.S.C. § 251(a).
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the term upon the payment of a fee.32 This even allows the patent owner to
enlarge the scope of the claims of the original patent if the application for
reissue is submitted within two years of the grant of the original patent.33
However, the broadened scope is limited to matter included in the original
application because “[n]o new matter shall be introduced into the application
for reissue.”34
The Federal Circuit has justified reissue patents by stating that “[r]eissue is
remedial in nature and is based on fundamental principles of equity and
fairness.”35 Along the same principles, reissue patent claims that are not
“substantially identical with the original patent” do not create causes of action
for conduct arising prior to the reissue of the patent.36 Courts may even grant
third parties the right to continue practicing the patented invention after the
grant of the reissue patent if “substantial preparation was made before the grant
of the reissue” or, in the context of process patents, “under such terms as the
court deems equitable for the protection of investments made or business
commenced before the grant of the reissue.”37
While reissuance applications made it easy for patent owners to fix errors
not caught by the PTO during examination, prior to 1980, district court
litigation was the only mechanism available to third parties to invalidate a
patent.38 Critics viewed this as a waste of time, money, and judicial resources
because of the often-lengthy duration of litigation.39 As a response, Congress
passed the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, which provided for the creation of the first
reexamination proceeding: ex parte reexamination.40 In contrast to reissuance,
“the purpose of reexamination is not to correct errors in patents, but rather to
provide a reassessment of existing claims in light of newly discovered prior art
or new interpretations of ‘old’ prior art.”41 Ex parte reexamination proceedings
allowed a third party to challenge a patent’s validity based on prior art not
previously considered.42 However, upon initiation of an ex parte reexamination

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id.
Id. § 251(d).
Id. § 251(a).
Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1439 n.28 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
35 U.S.C. § 252.
Id.
Kamholz, supra note 30, at 129–30.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id.
Baughman, supra note 25, at 351.
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proceeding, the third-party challenger played a very small role in the outcome,
as the proceeding continued on an ex parte basis.43 Congress further expanded
the available reexamination procedures in 1999 to create the inter partes
reexamination, a new kind of reexamination proceeding which allowed active
participation by third parties.44
One of the primary purposes of creating administrative reexamination of
patents was to provide “an effective and efficient alternative to often costly and
protracted district court litigation.”45 Due to certain limitations in the
reexamination procedures, however, these administrative proceedings were
proving to be “a less viable alternative to litigation for evaluating patent
validity than Congress intended.”46 These limitations included the limited role
of third parties in the original ex parte reexamination, the inability to appeal
the Board’s decision,47 and the often costly and lengthy duration of the
proceedings, frequently “taking several years to complete.”48 Additionally, the
inter partes reexaminations were first handled by a PTO examiner, whose
decision was then appealable to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(BPAI), the precursor to the current PTAB.49 This two-tiered review procedure
within the PTO in part caused lengthy resolutions of administrative reviews.50
Congress set out to address these concerns in the AIA. According to the
PTO, “The purpose of the AIA and [the PTO rules] is to establish a more
43

Id. at 352.
Id.
45 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45 (2011). “The reexam proceedings are a cheaper, quicker, better
alternative to resolve questions of patentability than costly litigation in Federal court, which can run into the
millions of dollars and last for years.” 157 CONG. REC. H4495 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Smith).
46 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45 (2011).
47 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2006) (effective 2002–2012) A third-party requester in an ex
parte reexamination proceeding had no right to appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(BPAI) and could not participate if the patent owner appealed a decision to the BPAI; a third-party requester in
an inter partes reexamination had the right to appeal to the BPAI from the primary examiner’s decision. Id.
Originally, the third-party requester had no right to appeal the Board’s decision, but a 2002 amendment gave
the third-party requester the right to appeal to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (effective 2002–2012).
48 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45 (2011). Other limitations cited by the House Committee Report
included the inability to challenge a patent’s validity based on § 102 prior use or prior offers for sale, § 101
subject matter eligibility or utility, or § 112 indefiniteness. Id. However, these limitations continue for IPRs
today under the America Invents Act. See Leahy–Smith American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
49 Va. Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 983 F. Supp. 2d 713, 752 (E.D. Va. 2014). The
BPAI was the predecessor to today’s PTAB. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 2,
§ 1201.
50 Jonathan Tamimi, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inexpensive Resolution of Patent
Validity, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 589–90 (2014).
44
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efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and
limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”51 From the outset,
each case is handled by the PTAB, which is comprised of three trained
administrative law judges.52 The PTAB is statutorily mandated to complete its
review and issue its final determination within one year of instituting an IPR.53
Congress further permitted the PTO to create regulations that “consider . . . the
ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings instituted under this
chapter.”54 Congress’s focus in reforming the patent system was on improving
these proceedings so that potentially invalid patents could not be used to
extract costly royalties from companies when litigating was cost prohibitive.55
B. Inter Partes Reexamination
Until the passing of the AIA, inter partes reexaminations were the only
administrative procedures that allowed a third party active participation in
challenging a patent’s validity based on prior art. The proceedings were often
lengthy, provided only limited participation by the third-party,56 and until
recently allowed limited appellate review.57 Thus, third parties often elected
instead to litigate in district courts.58 The AIA eliminated the inter partes
reexamination and replaced it with new administrative proceedings.59 This
section will outline the deficiencies in inter partes reexaminations and the
estoppel provisions that accompanied these proceedings.
Third parties could challenge a patent’s validity through an inter partes
reexamination based on patents or printed publications that the requester
believed raised a substantial question of patentability.60 However, these
proceedings never achieved much popularity due to the length of the

51

Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and
Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48680 (Aug. 14, 2012). “The
America Invents Act . . . will establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent
quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs, while making sure no party’s access to
court is denied.” 157 CONG. REC. S1360–02 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
52 Va. Innovation Scis., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
53 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
54 Id. § 316(b).
55 See 157 CONG. REC. H4482–83 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
56 Iancu et al., supra note 26, at 149–56.
57 Tamimi, supra note 50, at 589.
58 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45 (2011).
59 Iancu et al., supra note 26, at 148.
60 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 311 (2006).
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proceedings.61 Requests for inter partes reexaminations had no word limit and
could extend to several hundred pages.62 To meet the minimum threshold to
institute proceedings, a requester only had to show a substantial new question
of invalidity, compared to the increased “reasonable likelihood” of success
standard in IPRs.63 There was no statutory time limit to complete the
reexamination proceeding.64 Reexaminations often took between two and three
years to complete.65 Because a patent examiner conducted the initial
reexamination proceeding, the parties had to appeal to the BPAI, the precursor
to the PTAB, prior to appealing to the Federal Circuit.66 These shortfalls
caused substantial backlogs in the PTO, making inter partes reexaminations a
less attractive alternative to litigation.67
The pre-AIA Patent Act included two different estoppel provisions for inter
partes reexaminations.68 The first precluded petitioners from asserting in a
subsequent civil action “the invalidity of any claim finally determined to be
valid and patentable on any ground which the third-party requester raised or
could have raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings.”69 This
provision only applied if the inter partes reexamination resulted in a final
order.70 Similarly, the second estoppel provision stated that when a party failed
to prove invalidity in either a prior civil action or inter partes reexamination
resulting in a final decision, that party and its privies are precluded from
requesting an inter partes reexamination “on the basis of issues which that
party or its privies raised or could have raised in such civil action or inter
partes reexamination.”71 A decision not to institute proceedings did not trigger
these estoppel provisions.72

61

See Iancu et al., supra note 26.
Id. at 153.
63 Id. at 150.
64 Id. at 156.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 160; Andrei Iancu & Ben Haber, Post-Issuance Proceedings in the America Invents Act, 93 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 476, 477 (2011).
67 See Tamimi, supra note 50.
68 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(c), 317(b) (2006).
69 Id. § 315(c).
70 Id.
71 Id. § 317(b).
72 Vestcom Int’l, Inc. v. Grandville Printing Co., No. IPR2013-00031, 2013 WL 5970150, at *1, *8
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2013) (refusing to apply estoppel to invalidity grounds asserted in an inter partes
reexamination when the PTO declined to institute reexamination proceedings).
62
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Estoppel applied “not when examination is completed but only after all
appeal rights have been exhausted.”73 This included appeals up through the
Federal Circuit.74 Estoppel now attaches much more quickly in AIA
post-issuance proceedings—as soon as the final written decision is issued.75
Both previous estoppel provisions for inter partes reexaminations were
relatively weak compared to the current IPR estoppel provisions. First, a party
could defeat either inter partes reexamination estoppel provision if it could
show that the assertion of invalidity was “based on newly discovered prior art
unavailable” to the petitioner and PTO at the time of the inter partes
reexamination proceedings.76 Second, because estoppel only applied once all
appeals were exhausted, a third-party requester had “significant time before it
face[d] the consequences of estoppel.”77 Third, the estoppel provision applying
to subsequent district court litigation applied only to the requester of the inter
partes reexamination, leaving open the possibility for those privy to the
requester or other real parties in interest to challenge the patent’s validity based
on the same grounds in district court.78 The new AIA estoppel provisions
eliminate these gaps.79
C. Post-Grant Review Proceedings Under the AIA
The new post-issuance proceedings have become a widely utilized form of
challenging a patent’s validity since they became available September 16,
2012. The total number of inter partes reexamination requests filed between
November 29, 1999 and September 30, 2013 was 1,919.80 The total number of
IPR petitions between September 16, 2012 and August 7, 2014 was 1,585.81 In
less than two years, the number of IPR petitions almost eclipsed the number of
inter partes reexamination proceedings for a nearly fourteen-year period.
These numbers should be applauded. The PTAB has been able to resolve
disputes much more quickly and inexpensively than a federal district court ever

73

Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 642–43 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id.
75 Leahy–Smith American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
76 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(c), 317(b) (2006).
77 Iancu et al., supra note 26, at 151.
78 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).
79 See supra Part I.C.
80 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA—SEPTEMBER 30,
2013, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.pdf.
81 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD AIA PROGRESS 1 (Aug. 7,
2014), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/aia_statistics_08_07_2014.pdf.
74
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could. Because the results thus far have tended to favor petitioners,82 the
PTAB’s popularity is only growing, as accused infringers elect to petition to
review a patent’s validity instead of having the same issues adjudicated in a
federal district court.83 As soon as the PTAB final decisions work their way up
to the Federal Circuit, the PTAB’s redundancy doctrine will likely force the
Federal Circuit to decide whether it is a permissible use of the PTAB’s
discretion to not hear certain issues. To understand why this is so, this section
provides an overview of the new post-issuance proceedings—inter partes
review, post-grant review, and covered business method patent review.
Under the AIA, any third party, including one not threatened with a
lawsuit,84 may petition the PTO to review the patentability of any type of
patent in an IPR on the basis of either novelty85 or non-obviousness,86 as long
as that petition is filed a certain amount of time after the patent issues.87 This
review proceeding became available to petitioners on September 16, 2012.88
Trials are heard before the PTAB, but the PTAB is not authorized to consider
all forms of prior art89 that would ordinarily be available in a district court
proceeding. Instead, the PTAB may only consider “prior art consisting of
patents or printed publications.”90 The PTAB is precluded from considering
any potentially invalidating commercial offers for sale, prior uses, or anything
else “otherwise available to the public” that is available for novelty and
non-obviousness challenges in district courts.91 This type of review is available
82

As of October 1, 2015, only 18.27% of instituted claims have survived an IPR and only 4.35% of
instituted business method patent claims have survived a CBM review. Klodowski & Seastrunk, supra note 8.
83 Id.
84 Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Res. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that
Article III standing is a requirement to appeal to the Federal Circuit).
85 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
86 Id. § 103.
87 A petition for an inter partes review must be filed on the later of either “(1) the date that is 9 months
after the grant of a patent; or (2) if a post-grant review is instituted under chapter 32, the date of the
termination of such post-grant review.” Id. 311(c).
88 Yasser El-Gamal, Ehab M. Samuel & Peter D. Siddoway, The New Battlefield: One Year of Inter
Partes Review Under the America Invents Act, 42 AIPLA Q.J. 39, 41 (2014). The first Final Written Decision
was released by the PTAB on November 13, 2013. Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No.
IPR2012-00001, 2013 WL 6355081 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2013).
89 The definition of prior art is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 102. Prior art consists of patents, printed
publications, public uses of the invention, offers for sale of the invention, and disclosures “otherwise available
to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” Leahy–Smith America Invents Act,
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). The AIA removed all geographic limitations on prior art, which used to be restricted
to the United States with respect to public uses and offers for sale. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b)
(2006).
90 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
91 Id. §§ 102–103.
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for any subject matter and for any patent filed before and after the AIA took
effect, which currently accounts for almost all issued patents.92 As such, this is
the most popular form of post-issuance review.93
The grounds for invalidity that a third party may assert in a post-grant
review proceeding are much broader than the grounds available in IPRs. A
third party may challenge the validity of one or more patent claims in a PGR
based on any requirement for patentability, such as subject-matter eligibility,
utility, novelty, non-obviousness, or sufficient § 112 disclosure and claiming of
the invention.94 However, the third party must petition the PTO to review the
patent within nine months after the patent issues or reissues.95 PGRs are only
available to patents that were filed after March 16, 2013;96 there have been no
PGRs instituted to date due to the lack of patents that qualify.97
While the permitted grounds for challenging the validity of a patent are
broad in a CBM, the types of patents eligible for CBM review are narrow. A
covered business method patent is “a patent that claims a method or
corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations
used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or
service,” unless the invention is a technological invention.98 In CBMs, a third
party may not petition the PTO to review a patent unless the third party “has
been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement
under that patent.”99 The CBM patent can be challenged at any time after nine
months from the date the patent issues.100 CBM patents that were filed both
before and after March 16, 2013 can be challenged on any of the grounds
92

35 U.S.C. 311; El-Gamal, et al., supra note 88, at 42–43.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 2 (July 31,
2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-07-31%20PTAB.PDF (noting that from
September 12, 2012 to July 31, 2015, 3,277 IPR Petitions, 386 CBMs, and 10 PGRs were filed); Klodowski &
Seastrunk, supra note 8.
94 35 U.S.C. § 321(b). The AIA kept the requirement that the best mode must be disclosed somewhere in
the patent under § 112, but this is no longer a ground for which a patent may be invalidated. Id.
§ 282(b)(3)(A).
95 Id. § 321(c).
96 Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and
Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,687 (Aug. 14, 2012).
97 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(f)(2), 125 Stat. 284, 311 (2011).
98 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (2014). In determining whether an invention is a technological invention, the
PTAB looks on a case-by-case basis to “whether the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological
feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art” and whether it “solves a technical problem using a
technical solution.” Id. § 42.301(b).
99 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011).
100 37 C.F.R. § 42.303.
93
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available for PGRs, except that the eligible prior art varies depending on
whether the patent was filed in the first-to-invent system or first-to-file
system.101 The PTAB originally created the redundancy doctrine in a CBM
review and soon after applied it in the context of an IPR as well.102
These post-issuance proceedings differ from district court litigation in that
they provide for limited discovery and the patent owner is entitled to propose
amendments to the patent.103 The discovery procedures are geared towards
streamlining the proceedings.104 The parties are entitled to routine discovery,
which includes “(1) [p]roduction of any exhibit cited in a paper or testimony;
(2) the cross-examination of the other sides [sic] declarants; and (3) relevant
information that is inconsistent with a position advanced during the
proceeding.”105 The parties may also agree to additional discovery or move for
additional discovery, which requires a demonstration that “such additional
discovery is in the interests of justice.”106 Unlike in a district court proceeding,
the patent owner may move to amend one or more of its patent claims, if it
thinks it can distinguish its patent from the prior art.107 However, these
attempts have been mostly futile to this point, with motions to amend being
granted only about 6% of the time.108

101 A petitioner in a CBM review who challenges a patent filed in the first-to-invent system based on
novelty or non-obviousness may support that ground with pre-AIA § 102(a) prior art or prior art that “discloses
the invention more than 1 year before the date of the application for patent in the United States” and “would be
described by [pre-AIA] section 102(a) . . . if the disclosure had been made by another before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent.” Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(C),
125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011).
102 See infra Part II.B.
103 The limited discovery in IPRs is greater than in inter partes reexaminations, which provided for no
discovery. Iancu et al., supra note 26, at 149.
104 Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48761 (Aug. 14, 2012). “Limited discovery
lowers the cost, minimizes the complexity, and shortens the period required for dispute resolution.” Garmin
Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No. IPR2012-00001, 2013 WL 2023626, at *2–3 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5,
2013) (order denying motion for additional discovery).
105 Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48761 (Aug. 14, 2012).
106 37 C.F.R. § 42.51 (2014). Factors important in demonstrating that additional discovery is necessary
include (1) that it is “more than a possibility and mere allegation”; (2) whether the additional discovery relates
to the opposing party’s “litigation positions and the underlying basis for those positions”; (3) the “ability to
generate equivalent information by other means”; (4) whether instructions are “easily understandable”; and (5)
whether the requests are “overly burdensome”—including “financial burden, burden on human resources, and
burden on meeting the time schedule of [IPR].” Decision on Motion for Additional Discovery 37 C.F.R.
§§ 42.40 and 42.51(b)(2) at 6–7, Garmin Int’l, Inc., 2013 WL 2023626, 2013 WL 8696520 (capitalization
omitted) (denying motion for additional discovery).
107 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2012).
108 Klodowski & Seastrunk, supra note 8.
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Not every petition submitted for review to the PTAB is entitled to continue
to an invalidity proceeding; only petitions with a certain level of merit may
continue. The PTAB has different standards it must evaluate in making its
decision to institute proceedings depending on the type of administrative
proceeding. The PTAB may not institute an IPR unless the petitioner
demonstrates that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”109
This statute only specifies the guidelines for when the PTAB may not institute
an IPR. The PTO has gone a step further; under its authority to set the
standards for showing sufficient grounds to institute an IPR,110 it has given the
PTAB discretion on which claims and on which grounds it institutes
proceedings.111 For both PGRs and CBM reviews, the PTAB cannot institute
proceedings unless it decides that “the petition supporting the ground would, if
unrebutted, demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of the
claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable,” which takes into account the
patent owner’s preliminary response.112 The PTO gave the same discretion for
instituting proceedings to the PTAB for PGR and CBM review as it did for
IPR.113
In making its decision to institute, the PTAB relies on the petition itself and
the patent owner’s preliminary response.114 The petitioner is required to state
specifically each claim that is being challenged, whether the claim is being
challenged under § 102 or § 103, the prior art references that invalidate the
claim, and the portions of the prior art references that apply to the patent
claim.115 In light of the PTAB’s requirement to construe patent claims with
their “broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
patent in which it appears,”116 a petitioner has a greater chance of showing a
“reasonable likelihood” of success117 than it would in the context of district
court litigation, where courts presume the patent to be valid and give patent
claims their ordinary meaning from the perspective of a person having ordinary

109

35 U.S.C. § 314.
Id. § 316(a)(2).
111 The PTAB “may authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or
some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2014).
112 Id. § 42.208.
113 Id.
114 35 U.S.C. §§ 312–313.
115 Id. § 312(a).
116 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 (2014).
117 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
110
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skill in the art.118 In general, this broader approach to claim construction results
in finding that more prior art references speak to the claim limitations in the
patent at issue.119 If the PTAB decides to institute review of one or more patent
claims, it specifically states the grounds for invalidity serving as the basis for
its decision to institute and denies any remaining grounds.120 The PTAB “may
deny some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of the challenged
claims.”121 These procedures are all designed to streamline the adjudication
and to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every
proceeding.”122
Neither party may appeal a PTAB decision during a post-issuance review
proceeding until a final decision has been issued by the PTAB, and the
determination of whether to institute an IPR is “final and nonappealable.”123
Upon a final written decision, all appeals are directed to the Federal Circuit.124
This
eliminates intermediate administrative appeals of inter partes
proceedings to the BPAI, instead allowing parties to only appeal
directly to the Federal Circuit. By reducing two levels of appeal to
just one, this change . . . substantially accelerate[s] the resolution of
inter partes cases.125

In considering whether to file a petition for review under any of the
post-issuance proceedings, the third party must account for potential estoppel
effects: an adverse decision in an administrative proceeding could lead to the

118

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
The primary justification for this broader claim construction standard is that, “[s]ince patent owners
have the opportunity to amend their claims during IPR, [post-grant review], and [covered business method]
trials, unlike in district court proceedings, they are able to resolve ambiguities and overbreadth through this
interpretive approach, producing clear and defensible patents and the lowest cost point in the system.” Office
Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48764 (Aug. 14, 2012). See generally Dawn-Marie Bey &
Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent Office’s “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation”
Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285 (2009) (exploring the validity of the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard).
120 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.108(b), 42.208(b) (2014).
121 Id.
122 Id. § 42.1(b).
123 This was confirmed on the petitioner’s side in St. Jude Medical, Cardiology Division, Inc. v. Volcano
Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that immediate review from denial to institute
proceedings is not available), and on the patent owner’s side in In re Procter & Gamble Co., 749 F.3d 1376,
1378–79 (Fed Cir. 2014) (holding that immediate review of a decision to institute IPR proceedings is not
available).
124 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012).
125 157 CONG. REC. S1376 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
119
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petitioner later being estopped from asserting that ground or any other ground
it reasonably could have raised in the proceeding.126 Under the new AIA
regime, the PTAB may not institute proceedings if the “petitioner or real party
in interest” has already “filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim
of the patent” or “is estopped from challenging the claims on the grounds
identified in the petition.”127 After the conclusion of the proceeding, the
petitioner or the real party in interest is barred from asserting “any ground that
the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that [IPR],” not
just in subsequent proceedings in front of the PTO, but also in a district court
action or in a proceeding before the International Trade Commission.128
Estoppel attaches once the PTAB issues its final written decision.129
II. THE PTAB’S REDUNDANCY DOCTRINE AND ITS PROBLEMS
The PTAB has created a procedure, not explicitly provided for in the
statutes or regulations that it employs, which promotes quick adjudication over
a thorough review of the possible grounds for unpatentability. The PTAB will
often institute an IPR on certain proposed grounds for invalidity, but not
others, declaring certain references redundant or cumulative130 to those already
considered by the PTO.131 The petitioner “bears the burden of demonstrating
why the grounds asserted in the petition are not cumulative to one another.”132
The PTAB has one year from instituting the IPR to issue its final written
decision, so the PTAB declares prior art references cumulative as a way to
126

35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
37 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2014); see Anova Food, LLC v. Sandau, No. IPR2013-00114, 2013 WL 5947705,
at *8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 13, 2013) (precluding the petitioner from challenging the patent claims because the
petitioner held itself out as one continuous entity with another entity that already filed a civil action
challenging the validity of the claim).
128 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2).
129 Va. Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 713, 753 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“[T]he
preclusive effect of a PTAB final determination is triggered when the PTAB issues its final written decision—
regardless of whether an appeal is taken to the Federal Circuit.”).
130 E.g., Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., No. IPR2014-01427, 2015 WL 636455, at *7 (P.T.A.B.
Feb. 13, 2015). The PTAB uses the words redundant and cumulative interchangeably. Id.
131 Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc. v. Cont’l Auto. Sys. US, Inc., No. IPR2013-00014, 2013 WL 5970136
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2013) (denying request for rehearing because the grounds of patentability for which the
petitioner argued should be granted were cumulative to the references on which the petition was granted); see
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2014) (stating that information “cumulative to information already of record or being
made of record” is not material to patentability); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 2,
§ 2258.01 (defining a repetitive cumulative reference as “one that substantially reiterates verbatim the
teachings of a reference that was either previously relied upon or discussed in a prior Office proceeding even
though the title or the citation of the reference may be different”).
132 Intellectual Ventures Mgmt., LLC v. Xilinx, Inc., No. IPR2012-00019, at *10 (Feb. 12, 2013).
127
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limit the amount of references and grounds for invalidity that it must
consider.133 This Part will (1) explain what cumulative and redundant prior art
is generally; (2) describe how the PTAB’s use of the redundancy doctrine
inappropriately simplifies cases; and (3) discuss how the redundancy doctrine
causes estoppel to unfairly attach to grounds of patentability not considered by
the PTO.
A. Redundant/Cumulative Prior Art Generally
The idea of cumulative prior art existed prior to the AIA. Under the PTO’s
regulations, information that is “cumulative to information already of record or
being made of record in the application” is immaterial to patentability.134
When submitting an application for a patent, the applicant does not breach its
duty to disclose all information known to be material if that prior art reference
is cumulative to others already submitted.135 It is a practical doctrine that, in
simple situations, simplifies the record for the patent applicant, the PTO, and
all other interested parties. This doctrine also prevents patent applicants from
hiding material prior art under a long list of prior art references by overloading
the record.136 However, determining whether prior art is cumulative is not
always simple.137 “[W]hen a question of materiality is close, a patent applicant
should err on the side of disclosure.”138
Prior to the AIA, the primary context in which cumulative prior art arose
was in allegations of inequitable conduct.139 When filing a patent application,
an applicant has a duty to disclose all material prior art.140 If it breached this
duty, it could be found liable for inequitable conduct.141 However, “even where
an applicant fails to disclose an otherwise material prior art reference, that
133 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 (2014); see Illumina, Inc. v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No. IPR2013-00011,
2013 WL 5970134 (P.T.A.B. May 10, 2013) (holding that “considering multiple rejections for the same
unpatentability issue would unnecessarily consume the time and resources of all parties involved”).
134 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
135 Id.
136 Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants on Fire: Towards a Narrow Construction for Inequitable Conduct
as Applied to the Prosecution of Medical Device and Drug Patent Applications, 72 UMKC L. REV. 669, 716
(2004).
137 See id. at 727 tbl.1 (listing a number of Federal Circuit cases involving inequitable conduct and
cumulative prior art).
138 LNP Eng’g Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 275 F.3d 1347, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
139 4 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 27:46 (2015) (citing cases discussing
cumulative prior art in the context of inequitable conduct).
140 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
141 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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failure will not support a finding of inequitable conduct if the reference is
‘simply cumulative to other references.’”142 The Federal Circuit defined
cumulative references as a reference that “teaches no more than what a
reasonable examiner would consider to be taught by the prior art already
before the PTO.”143
Cumulative prior art also applied in the context of inter partes
reexaminations, in which requesters could not use cumulative prior art
references to demonstrate a substantial new question of invalidity.144 Here,
cumulative prior art was anything “already considered by the PTO in the
original prosecution or in prior reexaminations.”145
Redundant prior art did not arise until the PTAB created it to simplify
post-issuance reviews under the AIA. The basic concept of redundant prior art
is the same as cumulative prior art, except that it most often refers to prior art
references asserted during the current proceeding.146 The PTAB justifies its
usage under its requirements to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of every proceeding.”147 However, the biggest difference between
the usage of cumulative prior art doctrine in inter partes reexaminations prior
to the AIA and the use of redundant prior art doctrine in post-issuance
proceedings is that the redundant prior art has never before been considered by
the PTO.
B. The PTAB Uses Redundant Prior Art to Inappropriately Simplify Cases
The first PTAB decision under the new AIA regime that found certain
grounds cumulative, referred to in the order as “redundant grounds,” was in the
context of a covered business method patent proceeding.148 The petition
asserted 422 grounds of unpatentability against a total of twenty patent

142 Id. at 1574–75 (citing Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genetech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)).
143 Id. at 1575.
144 Robert Greene Sterne et al., Reexamination Practice with Concurrent District Court Litigation or
Section 337 USITC Investigations, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 12 (2010).
145 Id. at 26.
146 See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00003 (JL), 2012 WL 9494791
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012) (establishing the redundancy doctrine).
147 37 C.F.R § 42.1(b) (2014); see EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, No. IPR2013-00083, 2013
WL 5970177, at *2 (June 5, 2013).
148 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 9494791, at *1–2.
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claims.149 The PTAB identified two types of redundancy: (1) horizontally
redundant references, which involve “a plurality of prior art references applied
not in combination to complement each other but as distinct and separate
alternatives”; and (2) vertically redundant references, which involve “a
plurality of prior art applied both in partial combination and in full
combination.”150 For example, if prior art references A, B, and C could
individually invalidate a patent claim as either anticipated or obvious, the three
references would be horizontally redundant, and the PTAB would institute
review based on only one of the proposed grounds. If prior art reference A
would invalidate a patent claim as obvious, then combining prior art references
A and B for an obviousness challenge would be considered vertically
redundant, and the PTAB would again institute review based only on one of
the proposed grounds. For either form of redundancy, the PTAB wants
petitioners to assert only the strongest ground, or, if they are all equally
persuasive, assert only one rather than burden the PTAB and the patent owner
with every ground.151 For each ground to be considered, the petitioner must
“reasonably articulate[] why each ground has strength and weakness relative to
the other.”152
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.
provides an excellent example of these redundancy principles.153 In Liberty
Mutual, the PTAB found both horizontal and vertical redundancy in the
grounds of unpatentability submitted by the petitioner.154 The petitioner
challenged a claim pertaining to a wireless transmitter on obviousness
grounds.155 Three references were found to be horizontally redundant with
respect to the wireless-transmitter feature because the petitioner did not
articulate any relative strength or weakness between the three references.156 As
a result, the PTAB ordered the petitioner to choose only one of the three

149 Id. at *1. “[N]umerous redundant grounds would place a significant burden on the Patent Owner and
the Board, and would cause unnecessary delays.” Id.
150 Id. at *2. References are horizontally redundant when they “provide essentially the same teaching to
meet the same claim limitation” without explanation why one more closely satisfies the claim limitations than
the other. Id. References are vertically redundant when “fewer references than the entire combination are
sufficient to render a claim obvious,” or “the entire combination is relied on to render the same claim
obvious.” Id.
151 Id. at *2, *7.
152 Id. at *7.
153 Id.
154 Id. at *2–7.
155 Id. at *2.
156 Id. at *4.
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obviousness grounds for the PTAB to consider.157 Similarly, the petitioner
brought obviousness challenges against other claims based on an array of base
references, and then asserted additional obviousness challenges with the same
base array, but adding one additional reference to the array.158 Again, the
PTAB ordered the petitioner to choose which group of references the PTAB
should consider for its obviousness challenge.159
Since this decision, the PTAB has applied the concept of redundancy in the
context of IPRs as well.160 However, as explored later in this Comment, the
PTAB has expanded its use of redundancy beyond what it dictated in Liberty
Mutual.161 It also now expects the petitioner to choose between redundant
grounds before the petition is filed.162 If the petitioner has not done so, the
PTAB now chooses for the petitioner.163
In the extreme case, such as when the petitioner asserts hundreds of
grounds of unpatentability, allowing the PTAB to deny review of certain
grounds of unpatentability may be necessary to ensure “the just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.”164 However, narrowing the
proceeding by declaring certain grounds redundant to others could have
potential prejudicial effects on the petitioner as the case moves forward. The
result creates an unfair asymmetry between the patent owner and the petitioner
in the IPR proceeding and prevents the petitioner from ever having its
argument heard on that ground, whether in an IPR proceeding, concurrent
district court litigation, or on appeal.
When petitioners submit multiple prior art references to establish
independent grounds of unpatentability in a post-issuance proceeding, such as
those based on anticipation or obviousness, it is rare that each of these grounds
is completely identical to one another.165 The PTAB itself admits this.166
157
158
159
160

2013).

Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
See Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088, 2013 WL 5970180 (P.T.A.B. June 13,

161 See id. at *3 (declaring the asserted obviousness grounds of unpatentability redundant to the asserted
anticipation grounds).
162 Larose Indus., LLC v. Capriola Corp., No. IPR2013-00120 (JTA), 2013 WL 5947706 (July 22, 2013).
163 Id.
164 37 C.F.R. § 42.1 (2014).
165 Oracle Corp., 2013 WL 5970180, at *1.
166 “[I]t is rarely the case that the disclosures of different prior art references will be literally identical.” Id.
“[A] repetitive reference which cannot be considered by the Office during reexamination will be a rare
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Despite this admission, the PTAB frequently employs the redundancy doctrine
during CBMs and IPRs as a way to cut down the length of the proceeding.167
Every time the PTAB does this, it risks adversely affecting the petitioner—the
party whom these procedures were intended to protect168—because, under the
plain language of the statute, the petitioner then does not have the opportunity
to argue that ground of unpatentability during the remainder of the proceeding,
on appeal, or during concurrent litigation.169 This concern is highlighted by the
amount of requests for rehearing submitted by petitioners based on a denial of
the redundant grounds.170
Once the PTAB institutes an IPR on certain grounds, but declines to
consider these redundant references, the petitioner may not be able to refer to
these cumulative references for the remainder of the IPR (although this is not
yet entirely clear).171 The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the
occurrence since most references teach additional information or present information in a different way than
other references, even though the references might address the same general subject matter.” MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 2258.01(B)(3).
167 See Oracle Corp., 2013 WL 5970180, at *1–2 (declining on request for rehearing to institute review
on a single redundant obviousness ground when the PTAB instituted review based only on anticipation
grounds).
168 157 CONG. REC. H4480, 4481–82 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
169 See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e) (2012).
170 See, e.g., EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, No. IPR2013-00083, 2013 WL 5970177, at *1
(P.T.A.B. June 5, 2013) (declining to authorize redundant grounds of unpatentability and hold those grounds in
abeyance).
171 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (“The petitioner in an [IPR] of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results
in a final written decision under section 318(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not
request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner
raised or reasonably could have raised during that [IPR].” (emphasis added)); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.220 (2014)
(stating that the patent owner may file a response addressing any ground for unpatentability not already
denied); Ralph Loren & Gabriel McCool, PTAB Use of Redundancy May Have Unfair Estoppel Effect,
LAW360 (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/516272/ptab-use-of-redundancy-may-have-unfairestoppel-effect (arguing that this estoppel provision precludes the petition “from further raising those same
grounds in the same . . . proceeding”). However, in light of the statute specifying a final written decision under
§ 318(a) and of Federal Circuit cases interpreting similar language from the pre-AIA statute, it is unclear
whether a petitioner would in fact be estopped from asserting the rejected grounds in the same proceeding. See
St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp. 749 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that the
PTAB’s decision to deny institution of IPR proceeding was not appealable to the Federal Circuit because it
was not a final written decision under § 318(a), and the statute specifically says it is final and not appealable);
Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzi USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 643–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (interpreting “finally
determined” in pre-AIA estoppel statute to mean that estoppel “applies only after all appeal rights are
exhausted, including appeals of [the Federal Circuit]”). For a discussion on the estoppel effects in an IPR of
unpatentability grounds asserted in pre-AIA inter partes reexamination, see Vestcom International, Inc. v.
Grandville Printing Co., No. IPR2013-00031, 2013 WL 5970150, at *8–10 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2013) (holding
that grounds asserted in a petition for inter partes reexamination proceeding, which were denied review, did
not estop the same party from asserting identical grounds of unpatentability in an IPR).
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evidence that the claims are invalid based on grounds specified in the
institution of the IPR.172 Thus, if the PTAB institutes an IPR based on certain
grounds but not on others, the petitioner may be estopped from presenting
anything before the court that related to the grounds that were denied.
This is an issue for multiple reasons. The patent owner may refer to the
cumulative art and assert any defenses related to the cumulative art. Very
rarely does a petitioner submit two references that are completely identical in
every way. The patent owner can evaluate the cumulative art and determine if
anything distinguishes it from the references on which the IPR proceeding is
based, such as if the cumulative art teaches away certain aspects of the claim
limitations.173 If the patent owner can demonstrate that a cumulative prior art
reference teaches away the claim limitations, then the patent owner can show
that the patent is not obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and the petitioner may not
even be able to argue to the contrary. Additionally, the patent owner might
attempt to amend its patent claims in an effort to distinguish its patent claims
from the prior art and thus avoid a finding of unpatentability.174 If the PTAB
does not permit the petitioner to refer to prior art outside the scope of the
grounds instituted for review, the petitioner may be severely disadvantaged in
attempting to prevent the patent owner from amending its claims. The
petitioner cannot possibly anticipate how the patent owner will respond to the
grounds of unpatentability instituted by the PTAB.175 It is thus unreasonable
for the PTAB to expect the petitioner to determine the relative merits of each
ground for unpatentability and select one at the outset of the proceeding. Going
forward, if the PTAB continues to use the redundancy doctrine, it should make
clear that either both parties or neither party may refer to the redundant prior
art.
One example of this issue that has already occurred relates to the patent
owner’s ability to exclude a non-redundant prior art reference from the

172

35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
A patent owner can argue that a prior art reference teaches away certain aspects of its invention to
defend the patent against an obviousness challenge. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d
1540 (1983). A prior art reference teaches away certain aspects of the invention if the reference essentially
says not to incorporate a certain aspect into the invention, when in fact the invention does incorporate that
aspect. Id. at 1550. This is strong evidence that a patent claim is non-obvious, because the patent owner tried
something that the prior art said not to try. Id. at 1552.
174 35 U.S.C. § 316(d).
175 Berk-Tek LLC v. Belden Techs., Inc., No. IPR2013-00057, 2013 WL 5947699, at *3 (May 14, 2013)
(admitting it is unreasonable for the petitioner to anticipate the patent owner’s argument, but denying the
request for rehearing because the petitioner did not articulate meaningful distinctions between the grounds).
173
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proceeding through a defense not available to the redundant prior art
reference.176 In Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the
petitioner asserted four grounds challenging the validity of twelve patent
claims based on prior art references Roy and Roy II, both of which were
patents. Although the PTAB found that the petitioner established a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing on all four grounds, the PTAB instituted an IPR only
on the two grounds based on Roy, finding that the denied grounds were
“redundant” and “the substantive arguments [were] cumulative.”177 However,
the PTAB overlooked the possibility that the patent owner could remove Roy
as prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) by proving through a joint
research agreement common ownership between the subject matter and the
claimed invention at the time of the invention.178 If the cumulative reference,
Roy II, which was based on § 102(a) and would not be susceptible to this
defense, was allowed in as part of the review, this prejudice would be
avoided.179 In this case, the petitioner was able to alleviate this adverse effect
by filing a request for rehearing pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).180 However,
a petitioner only has up to fourteen days to file a request for a rehearing when
the PTAB institutes an IPR on at least one of the asserted grounds of
unpatentability.181 Given that petitioners are only entitled to limited discovery
to begin with, and are not entitled to any discovery prior to the institution of an
IPR, a possible oversight such as this may not be caught in time by the
petitioner.182
Another problem associated with this rule is that determinations on whether
to institute an IPR are “final and nonappealable.”183 This makes it difficult for

176

Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd. v. Vertex Pharm., Inc., No. IPR2013-00024 (SGL), 2013 WL 5970171 (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 5, 2013).
177 Id. at *10.
178 See id.
Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under one or more
subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this
section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the claimed
invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the
same person.
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(1) (2006).
179 Ranbaxy Request for Rehearing Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 2013 WL
5970171 (No. IPR2013-00024), 2013 WL 5376987.
180 Id.
181 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(1) (2014).
182 Id. § 42.51.
183 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012).
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the PTAB to revisit redundant grounds in the same proceeding, if necessary.184
It is not entirely clear how the PTAB would go about doing this, procedurally.
Because the PTAB never instituted proceedings based on those redundant
grounds, it would likely have to issue another order instituting proceedings
based on those redundant grounds, and then allow for another discovery
period. This option may only be available when the PTAB allows grounds
based on anticipation to continue and declares all grounds based on
obviousness redundant of those anticipation grounds.185 The issues surrounding
revisiting redundant prior art, if the PTAB allows it at all, call into question the
timing associated with making a determination that a prior art reference is
redundant. All final written decisions of the PTAB may be appealed to the
Federal Circuit for review.186 As such, the petitioner may appeal an adverse
final written decision to the Federal Circuit where PTAB rulings are reviewed
de novo for legal conclusions187 and reviewed for substantial evidence for
factual determinations.188 But when a valid ground for instituting an IPR is
denied because the PTAB declares that prior art cumulative to other grounds,
the petitioner loses its ability to appeal on that ground.189
The Federal Circuit, in In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies,190 has recently
adopted this stance on a similar issue in an appeal from a final written decision
in an IPR. On appeal, the court dealt with an issue related to the institution of

184

Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088, 2013 WL 5970180, at *2 (P.T.A.B. June 13,
2013) (stating that if the patent owner succeeded in rebutting the anticipation ground of unpatentability, “it
would become necessary and prudent to adjudicate the non-instituted obviousness ground in the instant
proceeding”). But see Larose Indus., LLC v. Capriola Corp., No. IPR2013-00120, 2013 WL 5947706
(P.T.A.B. July 22, 2013) (stating that separating the proceeding into two phases would “thereby introduce
unnecessary delay and inefficiency”).
185 See Oracle Corp., 2013 WL 5970180, at *2 (stating that if the patent owner succeeded in rebutting the
anticipation ground of unpatentability, “it would become necessary and prudent to adjudicate the noninstituted obviousness ground in the instant proceeding”).
186 35 U.S.C. § 141.
187 See Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC. v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that “the
court gives objective, de novo review to rulings of patent law, whatever their source”).
188 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).
189 See St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In
St. Jude Medical, the patent owner sued the petitioner for patent infringement in district court. Id. Based on the
stipulations of the parties, the court dismissed the action. Id. The petitioner later filed a petition for IPR more
than a year after the commencement of the patent infringement proceedings. Id. The PTAB declined to
institute an IPR, and the petitioner appealed to the Federal Circuit. Id. The Federal Circuit held that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear the appeal because a non-institution decision “is not a final written decision of the Board
under section 318(a), and the statutory provisions addressing inter partes review contain no authorization to
appeal a non-institution decision to this court.” Id.
190 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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an IPR proceeding.191 The patent owner argued that the cancellation of his
patent claims was due to an error at the institution stage because the PTAB
relied on prior art not contained in the petition. The owner also argued that he
was entitled to an appeal on this issue because the PTAB issued a final written
decision.192 The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
PTAB’s decision to institute proceedings under § 314(d).193 While not entirely
the same issue, this implies that the PTAB’s interpretation of the statutes and
regulations do not allow the petitioner to have any grounds reviewed that were
declared redundant at the institution stage. From a pure statutory construction
perspective, this makes sense. Otherwise, § 314(d) would be superfluous in
light of the fact that appeals are not permitted until the PTAB issues a final
written decision under § 318(a).194
It is easier to justify this consequence when the loss of right to an appeal
comes in the form of a denial to institute proceedings from all grounds related
to certain claims. Presumably in this instance, these grounds were denied
because the petitioner could not show a reasonable likelihood of success.
Additionally, a denial on these grounds has most likely not triggered collateral
estoppel with respect to any concurrent or subsequent district court litigation
because there was no final written decision.195
Arguably, the PTAB is impermissibly precluding the petitioners from
seeking review on these grounds as well, as long as it elects to institute the IPR
on some grounds. The statute requires the PTAB to “issue a final written
decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the
petitioner and any new claim added under section 316(d)” as long as an IPR is
instituted and not dismissed.196 One reasonable interpretation of this statute is
that, if the PTAB elects to institute an IPR, it must address the patentability of
each and every claim challenged in the original petition. At least one petitioner
has attempted to make this argument at the district court level, but that case
was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals from the
PTAB.197 However, even under this somewhat broad interpretation of the
191

Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1273.
193 Id.
194 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012).
195 See id. § 315(e)(2).
196 Id. § 318(a) (emphasis added).
197 Synopsys, Inc. v. Lee, No. 1:14cv674 (JCC/IDD), 2014 WL 5092291, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 9 2014); id.
at *6 n.6 (noting that the plain dictionary meaning of “any” includes “one, some, every, or all without
specification”).
192
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statute (requiring the PTAB to address all challenged patent claims), the statute
is still silent about what is required when multiple grounds speak to the same
patent claim.198 Thus, the statute may mandate that the PTAB address grounds
relating to the patentability of patent claims that were not instituted for review,
yet not require the PTAB to address grounds recognized as having a reasonable
likelihood of success.
This possible negative effect could greatly prejudice the petitioner: the
petitioner may be forced to assert a ground of unpatentability that turns out to
be weaker than grounds declared redundant. The PTAB may declare a prior art
reference cumulative for the purposes of the IPR, but that does not necessarily
mean the cumulative reference is identical in every way to references on which
the PTAB institutes the IPR.199 Indeed, the petitioner asserts multiple grounds
of unpatentability not to try and burden the PTAB, but because it perceives
different strengths and weaknesses between the prior art references, whether
that difference refers to specific technological disclosure in the reference, or a
factual difference, such as a different date of publication.200 It could be that
petitioner would win an appeal based on the cumulative references, which are
not appealable, but not on the appealable references.
The PTAB could potentially mitigate this risk if it continued with the
procedures it applied during Liberty Mutual, in which the petitioner was
allowed to choose which “redundant” ground of invalidity the PTAB would
consider.201 The PTAB has moved away from this, however, not giving the
petitioner any choice in the matter.202 For example, in Larose Industries, LLC
v. Cariola Corp.,203 the petitioner argued for a request for rehearing because
the PTAB declared certain grounds for unpatentability redundant.204 The
petitioner preferred the redundant ground to the non-redundant ground because
the patent owner could try to antedate the non-redundant prior art reference

198
199

2013).

See 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088, 2013 WL 5970180, at *1 (P.T.A.B. June 13,

200 EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC., No. IPR2013-00083 (JYC), 2013 WL 5970177, at *2
(P.T.A.B. June 5, 2013).
201 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00003 (JL), 2012 WL 9494791, at
*7 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012).
202 For an example of an IPR in which redundancy prevented the petitioner from asserting an obviousness
ground, see Osram GmbH v. Schubert, No. IPR2013-00459, 2014 WL 2528617, at *12 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 27,
2014).
203 No. IPR2013-00120 (JTA), 2013 WL 5947706 (P.T.A.B. July 22, 2013).
204 Id. at *2.
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and thus remove it as prior art.205 However, the PTAB found the argument
unpersuasive, stating that it should not alter the decision to institute
proceedings “based on what the parties ‘may’ argue in the future or so that
Petitioner may be in a better position to prevail.”206
It is easy to think of extreme examples in which it would be bad policy to
completely strip away the PTAB’s discretion in declaring prior art references
cumulative. If the petitioner sets forth hundreds of grounds based on hundreds
of prior art references, which all have a reasonable likelihood of invalidating
the patent, it would be next to impossible for the PTAB to review the
patentability of the claims based on the prior art references and still meet its
one-year deadline for issuing a final written decision.207 The PTAB has
clarified that it has complete discretion regarding which grounds of
unpatentability are allowed to proceed.208 However, many instances in which
the PTAB declines for redundancy reasons to institute proceedings result in
only a small number of grounds being denied.209 In these situations, it may be
in the best interest of the petitioner to have all of its arguments heard in light of
the minimal time saved in resolving the proceedings.
The redundancy doctrine has not stopped petitioners from attempting to get
all of their arguments heard. Instead of simply selecting their best prior art
references, some petitioners are filing multiple IPRs on the same claims,
including different prior references in each.210 This option allows petitioners to
spend more time on its original petition, which the PTO rules limit to sixty
pages for IPRs,211 explaining the importance of each patentability ground. It
also increases the workload of the patent owner and the PTAB, requiring them
to respond and make a decision on each petition.212
205 Id. Because this proceeding was based on a patent filed before the AIA took effect, a patent owner
could avoid potentially invalidating prior art references by showing that the inventor conceived the invention
prior to the date of prior art publication as long as the inventor was diligent in reducing the invention to
practice. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006).
206 Larose, 2013 WL 5947706, at *2.
207 37 C.F.R. § 42.1 (2014).
208 Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, IPR2013-00088, 2013 WL 5970180, at *3 (P.T.A.B. June 13,
2013) (“There is no magical number that defines the floor in determining redundancy.”).
209 See, e.g., id. at *1 (declining on request for rehearing to institute one additional ground of
unpatentability declared redundant at the institution stage).
210 See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd. v. Home Semiconductor, Inc., IPR2015-00467, 2015 WL 3826663
(P.T.A.B. June 17, 2015); Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd. v. Home Semiconductor, Inc., IPR2015-00466, 2015 WL
3826662 (P.T.A.B. June 17, 2015).
211 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a) (2014).
212 For example, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Nuvasive, Inc., the petitioner filed seven different IPR petitions
challenging four different patents. IPR2014-00087, 2014 WL 1410365 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2014); IPR2014-
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Because the IPR procedures are still very young, these issues have not yet
surfaced in the Federal Circuit, but time will tell whether the focus on speedy
resolution of proceedings rather than a thorough review of the asserted grounds
of unpatentability will ultimately lead to prejudicial decisions that favor the
patent owner. The PTAB must be careful not to create policies that discourage
the use of post-grant proceedings such as IPRs.
C. The Cumulative Prior Art Rule Risks Unfairly Triggering Estoppel Against
Petitioners
The driving force behind this newly created redundancy doctrine is the
emphasis on quick and efficient adjudication of patent validity issues.213 For
post-issuance proceedings to achieve that purpose, the PTAB must not use the
redundancy doctrine to force petitioners to give up potentially valid grounds of
unpatentability to obtain the benefits that post-issuance proceedings provide.
The main reason why the redundancy doctrine is so concerning is the likely
estoppel effects that attach in case of an adverse judgment against the
petitioner. In district court proceedings, a party may ordinarily appeal any
adverse decision by the court to the Federal Circuit.214 However, in
post-issuance proceedings, the Federal Circuit may only hear an appeal from a
final written decision of the PTAB.215 This dynamic must inform the third
party’s decision on whether to file a petition in front of the PTAB because a
petitioner may end up estopped from ever having a potentially valid ground of
unpatentability heard in any proceeding beyond the PTAB’s decision to
institute proceedings.216
The estoppel provision in the IPR statute specifies that, upon “a final
written decision under section 318(a),” the petitioner cannot assert in the
district court or subsequent appeals “that the claim is invalid on any ground
that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that IPR.”217
00081, 2014 WL 1410364 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2014); IPR2014-00076, 2014 WL 1410363 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8,
2014); IPR2014-00075, 2014 WL 1410375 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2014); IPR2014-00074, 2014 WL 1410361
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2014); IPR2014-00073, 2014 WL 1410360 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2014); IPR2014-00035, 2014
WL 1410357 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2014).
213 See supra Part I.C.
214 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012).
215 35 U.S.C. § 319.
216 Id. §§ 315(e), 325(e).
217 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (emphasis added). “The plain language of an IPR ‘that results in a final written
decision’ within § 315(e)(2) suggests that estoppel applies once there is a final written decision and not before
that time.” Pers. Audio LLC v. Togi Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-mc-80025 RS (NC), 2014 WL 1318921, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (discussing the merits of granting a stay of litigation).
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Presumably, this would include not only the grounds that were decided after
the institution of the IPR, but also any grounds that the petitioner asserted but
were denied review because they were cumulative to other grounds granted by
the PTAB. The plain language of the statute supports this interpretation, as it
does not refer to grounds instituted, but instead to grounds raised.218 The likely
result is that this provision estops the petitioner from asserting grounds of
unpatentability which neither the PTO nor a district court has ever considered,
leading to potentially unfair outcomes for the petitioner.
The manner in which estoppel attaches in post-issuance reviews is in
tension with the PTAB’s redundancy doctrine. Because the petitioner must
assert every ground for which the PTAB could invalidate the patent claims or
else risk being estopped from asserting those grounds in a later proceeding, the
petitioner is encouraged to assert every potential ground of unpatentability.219
However, the PTAB’s redundancy doctrine requires petitioners to refrain from
asserting any ground which the PTAB would deem redundant.220 Thus, if a
petitioner does not assert the ground of unpatentability, estoppel may apply in
later proceedings, and if a petitioner does assert the ground of unpatentability,
the same may be true.
A possible hypothetical demonstrates how prejudice could arise when
collateral estoppel attaches to the grounds found cumulative by the PTAB.
Person A, a patent owner, sues person B in district court for patent
infringement. Person B files a petition to institute an IPR with the PTO,
asserting multiple grounds for unpatentability, including those based on
anticipation and obviousness. The PTAB institutes the IPR based only on the
anticipation grounds, finding that the obviousness grounds are cumulative to
the anticipation grounds.221 The PTAB then issues its final written decision,
holding that the petitioner has not upheld its burden of demonstrating by a
preponderance of the evidence that the claims are invalid.222 At this point,

218

35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
Id.
220 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00003 (JL), 2012 WL 9494791, at *7
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012).
221 This scenario, in which the PTAB grants the petition based on the anticipation grounds, but finds that
the obviousness grounds are redundant has happened at least twice. See Osram GmbH v. Schubert,
No. IPR2013-00459, 2014 WL 2528617, at *12 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 27, 2014) (finding “the asserted grounds of
unpatentability . . . redundant in light of the . . . grounds of unpatentability on the basis of which” the PTAB
instituted review); see also Motorola Mobility LLC, v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, No. IPR2014-00500, 2014
WL 4593407, at *13 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 10, 2014) (same).
222 This scenario has happened at least once. See Osram GmbH, 2015 WL 296585, at *1.
219
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person B has lost the ability to challenge the validity of the patent based on
obviousness.
Person B then gets to appeal the decision of the PTAB based only on the
anticipation grounds to the Federal Circuit.223 If the Federal Circuit affirms the
decision of the PTAB, person B is out of options. Despite a showing that he
had a reasonable likelihood of invalidating the patent based on multiple
anticipation and obviousness grounds, person B was able to put forth
arguments related only to some of its anticipation grounds. The other grounds,
held to be cumulative, were not argued before the PTAB or the Federal Circuit.
Person B is also now estopped from asserting those grounds of invalidity in the
pending infringement suit in district court.224
Now consider the same facts, but this time the PTAB, after instituting
proceedings on the anticipation grounds but not the obviousness grounds, holds
in favor of the petitioner and invalidates some or all of the patent claims. The
patent owner then gets to appeal that adverse decision to the Federal Circuit.225
While the Federal Circuit gives some deference under the substantial evidence
standard to factual determinations made in the PTAB’s final written
decision,226 it reviews legal determinations de novo, making it easier to reverse
PTAB decisions.227 However, it cannot review any of the cumulative grounds
at the institution stage at all.228 If the Federal Circuit ultimately reverses the
PTAB decision because the patent is not anticipated by the prior art, the
petitioner is once again foreclosed from ever having its obviousness grounds
heard by a court. The PTAB’s decision to limit the grounds for patentability at
the institution stage may have saved time during the post-issuance proceeding,
but it prevented the Federal Circuit from considering those grounds on appeal
and most likely estopped the petitioner from asserting that ground in
concurrent or subsequent litigation.
This once again brings up another strange dynamic associated with the
estoppel provision: in this limited scenario, the petitioner would have actually
been better off if the PTAB declined to institute proceedings altogether rather
223

See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
225 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
226 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164–65 (1999).
227 Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC. v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “Whether a claimed
invention is unpatentable as obvious under § 103 is a question of law based on underlying findings of fact.” In
re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
228 See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012).
224
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than only partially instituting proceedings because estoppel does not attach to
grounds asserted before the PTAB when a final written decision is not reached.
This makes little sense. A ground for invalidity unlikely to succeed should not
be eligible for reconsideration in concurrent or subsequent district court
litigation when one that is reasonably likely to succeed may not.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
When considered in light of the purposes of the AIA post-issuance
proceedings, the estoppel resulting from the redundancy doctrine negatively
affects the petitioner in the context of the post-issuance proceeding and the
patent litigation structure as a whole. If estoppel applies to the redundant
grounds for invalidity, the petitioner has lost the right to challenge the patent
based on grounds that the PTAB agreed were meritorious in both the
post-issuance proceeding, on appeal, and in subsequent litigation.229 If estoppel
does not apply to the redundant grounds for invalidity, that substantially
impairs one of the primary purposes of post-issuance proceedings—to provide
a relatively cheap and quick alternative to patent litigation. This Part analyzes
the pros and cons of two proposed solutions: (1) instituting all meritorious
grounds, but continuing the proceeding based only on those the PTAB declares
non-redundant; and (2) interpreting the IPR statute so that grounds of
unpatentability outright denied are final, but redundant grounds are appealable
in the event of an adverse decision.
To avoid the loss of a petitioner’s right to appeal on a redundant ground,
the PTAB could institute an IPR based on all grounds that show a reasonable
likelihood of unpatentability and then declare some of the grounds cumulative
in a subsequent order. This continues to promote the PTO’s philosophy that
administrative proceedings should be quick and efficient,230 while at the same
time preserving the petitioner’s right to appeal on that ground. Given the rate at
which patents have been invalidated through the first two years of these
proceedings, this issue is unlikely to arise often.231 When it does, one open
question would be what the Federal Circuit would do if it reversed the PTAB?
Given that limited discovery is permitted in post-issuance proceedings,232 one
possibility is that the Federal Circuit could review the redundant prior art
references to determine if they compelled remanding the case back down to the
229
230
231
232

See supra Part II.C.
37 C.F.R. § 42.1 (2014).
Klodowski & Seastrunk, supra note 8.
35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(5), 326(a)(5).
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PTAB to reconsider the petitioner’s claim on the redundant grounds. Another
possibility is that the Federal Circuit could consider the merits of the redundant
grounds itself and issue a decision.
The PTAB has repeatedly declined to pursue either proposed solution,
usually arguing that instituting proceedings on all potentially meritorious
grounds would interfere with its duty to “secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.”233 In EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb
Technologies, the PTAB declined to simply institute the proceeding on all
meritorious grounds, deciding instead to continue based only on the grounds it
declared non-redundant.234 Its reasoning behind this was that “such a serial
procedure would introduce unnecessary, significant delays and
inefficiencies.”235 The only situation in which this would cause delays is when
the petitioner wins at the PTAB, but loses based on the instituted grounds on
appeal to the Federal Circuit.236 In this situation, “the final written
determination most likely would not be issued within one year after the date of
institution” because it would require “a second deposition of the same
witnesses, a second patent owner’s response, and a second reply.”237 Not only
is this an extremely questionable interpretation of the statutory provisions, it
also perfectly demonstrates how the PTAB has become far too concerned with
how quickly it can dispose of cases instead of the petitioner’s ability to
challenge patents.
It is hard to reconcile the PTAB’s interpretation of when it must issue its
final written decision with the language and purpose of the statute. The PTAB
is essentially saying that if the Federal Circuit reverses a PTAB decision, the
PTAB would not be able to issue a second, final written decision within one
year from the original date at which it instituted proceedings.238 But if this
were the case, it certainly would apply to every single post-issuance
proceeding that gets reversed on appeal. The Federal Circuit decided the first
appeal from a final written decision of a post-issuance proceeding after more
than two years of AIA post-issuance proceedings.239 It would be impossible to
233 37 C.F.R § 42.1(b) (2014); see EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, IPR 2013-00083 (JYC),
2013 WL 5970177, at *2 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2013).
234 2013 WL 5970177, at *1.
235 Id. at *3.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015), withdrawn on reh’g in 793 F.3d
1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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meet this deadline, redundant grounds or not. Forcing the parties to take a
second set of depositions and write new briefs would not make a difference on
this matter.
If the PTAB is instead saying that a new one-year clock starts from the time
the Federal Circuit remands the case, it is still unclear how conditionally
instituting proceedings based on every meritorious ground would frustrate the
PTAB’s one-year requirement.240 For one thing, the required discovery would
be less burdensome in a proceeding on remand than in a newly initiated
proceeding because the parties have already completed most of it. Second, the
claim construction part of the proceeding would already be complete, and there
would be no need to repeat this step. If the PTAB can adjudicate a newly
initiated post-issuance proceeding within one year, it makes no sense why the
PTAB could not complete a remanded post-issuance proceeding within one
year as well.
The only plausible interpretation of the statute that would correspond with
how the PTAB addressed the issue is one based only on a procedural
technicality that would either cause more work for the PTAB or significantly
prejudice the petitioner.241 The PTAB may be saying that because it has
already issued a final written decision for all the grounds of unpatentability,
even though that final written decision turned out to be wrong, it has satisfied
its statutory one-year mandate. At this point, one of two things may occur:
(1) the petitioner would be allowed to start over and resubmit a petition for an
IPR based only on the redundant grounds; or (2) the petitioner would be
estopped from ever asserting the redundant grounds again. The first possibility
is unlikely. If the PTAB’s incorrect final written decision allows the PTAB to
say it has met its one-year adjudication requirement, then it also estops the
petitioner from filing a second petition based on the redundant grounds for
unpatentability, because that petition would be based on a ground the petitioner
“raised or reasonably could have raised” during the original post-issuance
review.242 But if this were the case, the PTAB would be creating more work
for itself by having to restart the whole process, including the petition for
review, additional responses from the parties, and the discovery to go along
with it—assuming the petitioner could still articulate a reasonable likelihood of
success based on the previously declared-redundant grounds.

240
241
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EMC Corp., 2013 WL 5970177, at *3.
In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 778 F.3d at 1287.
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
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A second solution would be to interpret § 314 in such a way that outright
denials to institute proceedings are final and not appealable, but denials for
redundancy become appealable upon the final written decision of the PTAB.
The proper construction here would interpret “final and nonappealable” to
refer only to when the PTAB states that the petitioner has not met its likelihood
of success burden.243 However, any grounds that the PTAB determines
demonstrate a likelihood of success should be appealable due to the lack of
statutory authority given to the PTAB to deny such grounds of
unpatentability.244
An advantage to this structure is that the PTAB would not have any
problems meeting its one-year deadline for issuing a final written decision
because the PTAB’s proceeding would remain largely unchanged. On appeal
the petitioner would have to prove that the PTAB erred in declaring certain
grounds redundant. The Federal Circuit is experienced in making these
determinations, as it has been doing so in the context of inequitable conduct for
some time.245 This structure would achieve the optimal balance between quick
resolution of post-issuance proceedings, minimal effects on the docket of the
Federal Circuit, and thorough review of proposed grounds for invalidity.
One disadvantage to these solutions is that they could cause wasteful delays
in the proceedings. It would be much quicker for the parties to adjudicate the
proceedings on all meritorious grounds at the same time if the Federal Circuit
ultimately reverses the PTAB’s redundancy decisions, allowing the petitioner
to try again. However, if the rate of claim cancellation continues at its current
level,246 the time saved by simplifying proceedings in the aggregate is likely to
exceed the time wasted when the Federal Circuit reverses a redundancy
decision. Thus, these solutions promote the rights of third-party requesters and
the thorough review of patents, while risking minimal effects to the integrity of
the post-issuance review system.
In any case, the PTAB should scale back its use of the redundancy doctrine
and use it closer to its intended purpose outlined in Liberty Mutual.247 As the
number of grounds declared redundant decreases, especially when the PTAB

243

Id. § 314(d).
Id. § 314(a) (stating only when the PTAB may not institute proceedings).
245 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
246 Klodowski & Seastrunk, supra note 8.
247 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00003 (JL), 2012 WL 9494791
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012).
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eliminates only one or two grounds,248 the chance that the redundancy decision
gets reversed on appeal, thus increasing the length of the proceeding,
outweighs the minimal benefits in marginally simplifying the case. At a
minimum, the PTAB should favor inclusion of all potentially meritorious
grounds, rather than placing the burden on the petitioner to demonstrate that
prior art is not redundant.249 Both the lack of explicit statutory authority for the
redundancy doctrine and the nature of prior art references to teach or disclose
information differently bolster this policy.250 The PTAB should instead
preserve the redundancy doctrine for prior art references that are nearly
identical to one another or for when the number of meritorious grounds impairs
the PTAB’s ability to meet its one-year statutory requirement.251
CONCLUSION
The redundancy doctrine creates an unfair asymmetry between the
petitioner and the patent owner that is heightened even more with respect to the
estoppel that attaches to appeals and subsequent litigation. This kind of
asymmetry should not be permitted in light of the AIA’s overall purpose: to
provide a quick and inexpensive alternative to litigation. One of the driving
forces that inspired the creation of these post-issuance proceedings was the
public concern of unnecessary litigation caused by PAEs.252 Congress was
more concerned about protecting the accused infringer from costly litigation
and eliminating low-quality patents from the patent system than it was about
protecting the patent owner from attacks on their patents.253 As long as the
accused infringer has the means, desire, and reasonable grounds to do so, the
accused infringer should be permitted to challenge the patent’s validity on any
of those reasonable grounds.

248 See Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088, 2013 WL 5970180, at *2 (P.T.A.B. June
13, 2013) (declining on request for rehearing to institute review on a single redundant obviousness ground
when the PTAB instituted review based only on anticipation grounds).
249 Intellectual Ventures Mgmt., LLC v. Xilinx, Inc., No. IPR2012-00019, 2013 WL 8149388, at *10
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2013).
250 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 2, § 2258.01.
251 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2012).
252 See supra Part I.
253 See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and
Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48680 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“The
purpose of the AIA and [the PTO rules] is to establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will
improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”).
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Two proposed solutions would help eliminate the asymmetry created with
the redundancy doctrine. The PTAB could institute proceedings based on every
ground of unpatentability that shows a reasonable likelihood of success, but
continue the proceeding based only on grounds it deems non-redundant. This
would preserve the petitioner’s right to appeal on those grounds and allow the
petitioner to use those redundant references to rebut evidence put forth by the
patent owner, if necessary. Another solution would be to construe 35 U.S.C.
§ 314, which states that denied grounds of unpatentability are not
appealable,254 such that redundant grounds of unpatentability do not fall under
this category. This would allow the petitioner to appeal based on these
redundant grounds and the Federal Circuit to reference this prior art in making
its determination. However, until the PTAB changes its policies for declaring
possibly invalidating prior art redundant, the petitioner must evaluate its
repertoire of invalidity grounds and make a determination if it wants to risk
being estopped from asserting certain grounds of invalidity before those
grounds are ever determined on the merits.255 In certain circumstances, the
petitioner might be better off arguing its case in a district court proceeding,
rather than a post-issuance proceeding.
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